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The Origins of the
American Military
Coup of 2012
Charles J. Dunlap Jr.
This article was first published in the Winter 1992-93 issue of Parameters.

The letter that follows takes us on a darkly imagined excursion into
the future. A military coup has taken place in the United States—the year is
2012—and General Thomas E. T. Brutus, Commander-in-Chief of the Unified
Armed Forces of the United States, now occupies the White House as permanent
Military Plenipotentiary. His position has been ratified by a national referendum, though scattered disorders still prevail and arrests for acts of sedition are
underway. A senior retired officer of the Unified Armed Forces, known here
simply as Prisoner 222305759, is one of those arrested, having been convicted
by court-martial for opposing the coup. Prior to his execution, he is able to
smuggle out of prison a letter to an old War College classmate discussing the
“Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012.” In it, he argues that the coup
was the outgrowth of trends visible as far back as 1992. These trends were the
massive diversion of military forces to civilian uses, the monolithic unification
of the armed forces, and the insularity of the military community. His letter
survives and is here presented verbatim.
It goes without saying (I hope) that the coup scenario above is
purely a literary device intended to dramatize my concern over certain
contemporary developments affecting the armed forces, and is emphatically not
a prediction.
—The Author
Dear Old Friend,
It’s hard to believe that 20 years have passed since we graduated from the
War College! Remember the great discussions, the trips, the parties, the people?
Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, is the Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate, US Central Command, at MacDill AFB, Florida. He is a graduate of St.
Joseph’s University (Pa.), the Villanova University School of Law, and the Armed Forces
Staff College, and he is a Distinguished Graduate of the National War College, Class
of 1992. He has taught at the Air Force Judge Advocate General’s School, and served
tours in Korea and the United Kingdom. In 1987 he was a Circuit Military Judge, First
Judicial Circuit, and was subsequently assigned to the Air Staff in the Office of the Judge
Advocates’ Association as the USAF’s Outstanding Career Armed Services Attorney of
1992. The present article is adapted from his National War College student paper that
was co-winner of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1991-92 Strategy Essay
Competition, in which students from all the senior service colleges compete.
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Those were the days!!! I’m not having quite as much fun anymore. You’ve
heard about the Sedition Trials? Yeah, I was one of those arrested—convicted
of “disloyal statements,” and “using contemptuous language towards officials.”
Disloyal? No. Contemptuous? You bet! With General Brutus in charge it’s not
hard to be contemptuous.
I’ve got to hand it to Brutus, he’s ingenious. After the President died he
somehow “persuaded” the Vice President not to take the oath of office. Did we
then have a President or not? A real “Constitutional Conundrum” the papers
called it.1 Brutus created just enough ambiguity to convince everyone that as the
senior military officer, he could—and should— declare himself Commanderin-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces. Remember what he said? “Had to fill
the power vacuum.” And Brutus showed he really knew how to use power:
he declared martial law, “postponed” the elections, got the Vice President to
“retire,” and even moved into the White House! “More efficient to work from
there,” he said. Remember that?
When Congress convened that last time and managed to pass the
Referendum Act, I really got my hopes up. But when the Referendum approved
Brutus’s takeover, I knew we were in serious trouble. I caused a ruckus, you
know, trying to organize a protest. Then the Security Forces picked me up. My
quickie “trial” was a joke. The sentence? Well, let’s just say you won’t have to
save any beer for me at next year’s reunion. Since it doesn’t look like I’ll be
seeing you again, I thought I’d write everything down and try to get it to you.
I am calling my paper the “Origins of the American Military Coup of
2012.” I think it’s important to get the truth recorded before they rewrite history.
If we’re ever going to get our freedom back, we’ve got to understand how we got
into this mess. People need to understand that armed forces exist to support and
defend government, not to be the government. Faced with intractable national
problems on one hand, and an energetic and capable military on the other, it can
be all too seductive to start viewing the military as a cost-effective solution. We
made a terrible mistake when we allowed the armed forces to be diverted from
their original purpose.
I found a box of my notes and clippings from our War College days—
told my keepers I needed them to write the confession they want. It’s amazing;
looking through these old papers makes me realize that even back in 1992 we
should have seen this coming. The seeds of this outrage were all there; we just
didn’t realize how they would grow. But isn’t that always the way with things
like this? Somebody once said that “the true watersheds in human affairs are
seldom spotted amid the tumult of headlines broadcast on the hour.”2 And we
had a lot of headlines back in the ‘90s to distract us: The economy was in the
dumps, crime was rising, schools were deteriorating, drug use was rampant, the
environment was in trouble, and political scandals were occurring almost daily.
Still, there was some good news: the end of the Cold War as well as America’s
recent victory over Iraq.
All of this and more contributed to the situation in which we find
ourselves today: a military that controls government and one that, ironically,
can’t fight. It wasn’t any single cause that led us to this point. Instead, it was a
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combination of several different developments, the beginnings of which were
evident in 1992. Here’s what I think happened:
Americans became exasperated with democracy. We were disillusioned
with the apparent inability of elected government to solve the nation’s dilemmas. We were looking for someone or something that could produce workable
answers. The one institution of government in which the people retained faith
was the military. Buoyed by the military’s obvious competence in the First Gulf
War, the public increasingly turned to it for solutions to the country’s problems.
Americans called for an acceleration of trends begun in the 1980s: tasking the
military with a variety of new, non-traditional missions, and vastly escalating
its commitment to formerly ancillary duties.
Though not obvious at the time, the cumulative effect of these new
responsibilities was to incorporate the military into the political process to an
unprecedented degree. These additional assignments also had the perverse
effect of diverting focus and resources from the military’s central mission of
combat training and warfighting. Finally, organizational, political, and societal
changes served to alter the American military’s culture. Today’s military is not
the one we knew when we graduated from the War College.
Let me explain how I came to these conclusions. In 1992 not very many
people would’ve thought a military coup d’état could ever happen here. Sure,
there were eccentric conspiracy theorists who saw the Pentagon’s hand in the
assassination of President Kennedy,3 President Nixon’s downfall,4 and similar
events. But even the most avid believers had to admit that no outright military
takeover had ever occurred before now. Heeding Washington’s admonitions in
his farewell address about the dangers of overgrown military establishments,5
Americans generally viewed their armed forces with a judicious mixture of
respect and wariness.6 For over two centuries that vigilance was rewarded, and
most Americans came to consider the very notion of a military coup preposterous. Historian Andrew Janos captured the conventional view of the latter half
of the 20th century in this clipping I saved:
A coup d’état in the United States would be too fantastic to contemplate, not only because few would actually entertain the idea, but also
because the bulk of the people are strongly attached to the prevailing political system and would rise in defense of a political leader
even though they might not like him. The environment most hospitable to coups d’état is one in which political apathy prevails as the
dominant style.7

However, when Janos wrote that back in 1964, 61.9 percent of the electorate voted. Since then voter participation has steadily declined. By 1988 only
50.1 percent of the eligible voters cast a ballot.8 Simple extrapolation of those
numbers to last spring’s Referendum would have predicted almost exactly the
turnout. It was precisely reversed from that of 1964: 61.9 percent of the electorate did not vote.
America’s societal malaise was readily apparent in 1992. Seventy-eight
percent of Americans believed the country was on the “wrong track.” One
researcher declared that social indicators were at their lowest level in 20 years
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and insisted “something [was] coming loose in the social infrastructure.” The
nation was frustrated and angry about its problems.9
America wanted solutions and democratically elected government
wasn’t providing them.10 The country suffered from a “deep pessimism about
politicians and government after years of broken promises.”11 David Finkle
observed in the Washington Post Magazine that for most Americans “the
perception of government is that it has evolved from something that provides
democracy’s framework into something that provides obstacles, from something to celebrate into something to ignore.” Likewise, politicians and their
proposals seemed stale and repetitive. Millions of voters gave up hope of finding
answers.12 The “environment of apathy” Janos characterized as a precursor to
a coup had arrived.
Unlike the rest of government the military enjoyed a remarkably steady
climb in popularity throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.13 And indeed it had
earned the admiration of the public. Debilitated by the Vietnam War, the US
military set about reinventing itself. As early as 1988 U.S. News & World
Report heralded the result: “In contrast to the dispirited, drug-ravaged, doyour-own-thing armed services of the ‘70s and early ‘80s the US military has
been transformed into a fighting force of gung-ho attitude, spit-shined discipline, and ten-hut morale.”14 After the US military dealt Iraq a crushing defeat
in the First Gulf War, the ignominy of Vietnam evaporated.
When we graduated from the War College in 1992, the armed forces
were the smartest, best educated, and best disciplined force in history.15 While
polls showed that the public invariably gave Congress low marks, a February
1991 survey disclosed that “public confidence in the military soar[ed] to 85
percent, far surpassing every other institution in our society.” The armed forces
had become America’s most—and perhaps only— trusted arm of government.16
Assumptions about the role of the military in society also began to
change. Twenty years before we graduated, the Supreme Court confidently
declared in Laird v. Tatum that Americans had a “traditional and strong resistance to any military intrusion into civilian affairs.”17 But Americans were now
rethinking the desirability and necessity of that resistance. They compared the
military’s principled competence with the chicanery and ineptitude of many
elected officials, and found the latter wanting.18
Commentator James Fallows expressed the new thinking in an August
1991 article in Atlantic magazine. Musing on the contributions of the military
to American society, Fallows wrote: I am beginning to think that the only way
the national government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a security
threat and turn the job over to the military.” He elaborated on his reasoning:
According to our economic and political theories, most agencies of
the government have no special standing to speak about the general
national welfare. Each represents a certain constituency; the interest
groups fight it out. The military, strangely, is the one government
institution that has been assigned legitimacy to act on its notion of
the collective good. “National defense” can make us do things—train
engineers, build highways—that long-term good of the nation or
common sense cannot.19
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About a decade before Fallows’ article appeared, Congress initiated
the use of “national defense” as a rationale to boost military participation in an
activity historically the exclusive domain of civilian government: law enforcement. Congress concluded that the “rising tide of drugs being smuggled into
the United States . . . present[ed] a grave threat to all Americans.” Finding the
performance of civilian law enforcement agencies in counteracting that threat
unsatisfactory, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981.20 In doing so Congress specifically intended
to force reluctant military commanders to actively collaborate in police work.21
This was a historic change of policy. Since the passage of the Posse
Comitatus Act in 1878, the military had distanced itself from law enforcement
activities.22 While the 1987 law did retain certain limits on the legal authority of
military personnel, its net effect was to dramatically expand military participation in anti-drug efforts.23 By 1991 the Department of Defense was spending
$1.2 billion on counternarcotics crusades. Air Force surveillance aircraft were
sent to track airborne smugglers; Navy ships patrolled the Caribbean looking
for drug-laden vessels; and National Guardsmen were searching for marijuana
caches near the borders.24 By 1992 “combatting” drug trafficking was formally
declared a “high national security mission.”25
It wasn’t too long before 21st-century legislators were calling for more
military involvement in police work.26 Crime seemed out of control. Most disturbing, the incidence of violent crime continued to climb.27 Americans were
horrified and desperate: a third even believed vigilantism could be justified.28
Rising lawlessness was seen as but another example of the civilian political
leadership’s inability to fulfill government’s most basic duty to ensure public
safety.29 People once again wanted the military to help.
Hints of an expanded police function were starting to surface while
we were still at the War College. For example, District of Columbia National
Guardsmen established a regular military presence in high-crime areas.30
Eventually, people became acclimated to seeing uniformed military personnel patrolling their neighborhood.31 Now troops are an adjunct to almost all
police forces in the country. In many of the areas where much of our burgeoning population of elderly Americans live—Brutus calls them “National
Security Zones”— the military is often the only law enforcement agency.
Consequently, the military was ideally positioned in thousands of communities to support the coup.
Concern about crime was a major reason why General Brutus’s actions
were approved in the Referendum. Although voter participation by the general
public was low, older Americans voted at a much higher rate.32 Furthermore,
with the aging of the baby boom generation, the block of American voters over
45 grew to almost 53 percent of the voters by 2010.33 This wealthy,34 older electorate welcomed an organization which could ensure their physical security.35
When it counted, they backed Brutus in the Referendum—probably the last
votes they’ll ever cast.
The military’s constituency was larger than just the aged. Poor
Americans of all ages became dependent upon the military not only for
protection against crime, but also for medical care. Again we saw the roots

Winter 2010-11

111

Charles J. Dunlap Jr.

of this back in 1992. First it was the barely defeated proposal to use veterans’ hospitals to provide care for the non-veteran poor.36 Next were calls to
deploy military medical assets to relieve hard-pressed urban hospitals.37 As
the number of uninsured and underinsured grew, the pressure to provide care
became inexorable. Now military hospitals serve millions of new, non-military
patients. Similarly, a proposal to use so-called “underutilized” military bases
as drug rehabilitation centers was implemented on a massive scale.38
Even the youngest citizens were co-opted. During the 1990s the public
became aware that military officers had the math and science backgrounds
desperately needed to revitalize US education.39 In fact, programs involving
military personnel were already underway while we were at the War College.40
We now have an entire generation of young people who have grown up comfortable with the sight of military personnel patrolling their streets and teaching
in their classrooms.
As you know, it wasn’t just crises in public safety, medical care, and
education that the military was tasked to mend. The military was also called
upon to manage the cleanup of the nation’s environmental hazards. By 1992
the armed services were deeply involved in this arena, and that involvement
mushroomed. Once the military demonstrated its expertise, it wasn’t long
before environmental problems were declared “national security threats” and
full responsibility devolved to the armed forces.41
Other problems were transformed into “national security” issues. As
more commercial airlines went bankrupt and unprofitable air routes dropped,
the military was called upon to provide “essential” air transport to the affected
regions. In the name of national defense, the military next found itself in the
sealift business. Ships purchased by the military for contingencies were leased,
complete with military crews, at low rates to US exporters to help solve the
trade deficit.42 The nation’s crumbling infrastructure was also declared a
“national security threat.” As was proposed back in 1991, troops rehabilitated
public housing, rebuilt bridges and roads, and constructed new government
buildings. By late 1992, voices in both Congress and the military had reached
a crescendo calling for military involvement across a broad spectrum of heretofore purely civilian activities.43 Soon, it became common in practically every
community to see crews of soldiers working on local projects.44 Military attire
drew no stares.
The revised charter for the armed forces was not confined to domestic
enterprises. Overseas humanitarian and nation-building assignments proliferated.45 Though these projects have always been performed by the military on
an ad hoc basis, in 1986 Congress formalized that process. It declared overseas
humanitarian and civic assistance activities to be “valid military missions” and
specifically authorized them by law.46 Fueled by favorable press for operations
in Iraq, Bangladesh, and the Philippines during the early 1990s, humanitarian
missions were touted as the military’s “model for the future.”47 That prediction
came true. When several African governments collapsed under AIDS epidemics
and famines around the turn of the century, US troops—first introduced to the
continent in the 1990s—were called upon to restore basic services. They never
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left.48 Now the US military constitutes the de facto government in many of those
areas. Once again, the first whisperings of such duties could be heard in 1992.49
By the year 2000 the armed forces had penetrated many vital aspects of
American society. More and more military officers sought the kind of autonomy
in these civilian affairs that they would expect from their military superiors
in the execution of traditional combat operations. Thus began the inevitable
politicization of the military. With so much responsibility for virtually everything government was expected to do, the military increasingly demanded a
larger role in policymaking. but in a democracy policymaking is a task best left
to those accountable to the electorate. Nonetheless, well-intentioned military
officers, accustomed to the ordered, hierarchial structure of military society,
became impatient with the delays and inefficiencies inherent in the democratic
process. Consequently, they increasingly sought to avoid it. They convinced
themselves that they could more productively serve the nation in carrying
out their new assignments if they accrued to themselves unfettered power to
implement their programs. They forgot Lord Acton’s warning that “all power
corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”50
Congress became their unwitting ally. Because of the popularity of the
new military programs—and the growing dependence upon them—Congress
passed the Military Plenipotentiary Act of 2005. This legislation was the legacy
of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Among many
revisions, Goldwater-Nchols strengthened the office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and mandated numerous changes intended to increase
“jointness” in the armed services.51 Supporters of the Military Plenipotentiary
Act argued that unity of command was critical to the successful management
of the numerous activities now considered “military” operations. Moreover,
many Congressmen mistakenly believed that Goldwater-Nichols was one
of the main reasons for the military’s success in the First Gulf War.52 They
viewed the Military Plenipotentiary Act as an enhancement of the strengths of
Goldwater-Nichols.
In passing this legislation Congress added greater authority to the military’s top leadership position. Lulled by favorable experiences with Chairmen
like General Colin Powell,53 Congress saw little danger in converting the office
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the even more powerful Military
Plenipotentiary. No longer merely an advisor, the Military Plenipotentiary
became a true commander of all US services, purportedly because that status
could better ameliorate the effects of perceived interservice squabbling. Despite
warnings found in the legislative history of Goldwater-Nichols and elsewhere,
enormous power was concentrated in the hands of a single, unelected official.54
Unfortunately, Congress presumed that principled people would always occupy
the office.55 No one expected a General Brutus would arise.
The Military Plenipotentiary was not Congress’s only structural change
in military governance. By 2007 the services were combined to form the
Unified Armed Forces. Recall that when we graduated from the War College
greater unification was being seriously suggested as an economy measure.56
Eventually that consideration, and the conviction that “jointness” was an
unqualified military virtue,57 led to unification. But unification ended the
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creative tension between the services.58 Besides rejecting the operational logic
of separate services,59 no one seemed to recognize the checks-and-balances
function that service separatism provided a democracy obliged to maintain
a large, professional military establishment. The Founding Fathers knew the
importance of checks and balances in controlling the agencies of government:
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . Experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary controls . . .[including] supplying opposite
and rival interests.”60
Ambition is a natural trait of military organizations and their leaders.61
Whatever might have been the inefficiencies of separate military services, their
very existence served to counteract the untoward desires of any single service.
The roles and missions debates and other arguments, once seen as petty military infighting, also provided an invaluable forum for competitive analysis
of military doctrine. Additionally, they served to ensure that unscrupulous
designs by a segment of the military establishment were ruthlessly exposed.
Once the services were unified, the impetus to do so vanished, and the authority of the military in relation to the other institutions of government rose.62
Distended by its pervasive new duties, monolithic militarism came to dominate
the Darwinian political environment of 21st-century America.
Why did the uniformed leadership of our day acquiesce to this transformation of the military? Much of the answer can be traced to the budget
showdowns of the early 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the US
military without an easily articulated rationale for large defense budgets.
Billions in cuts were sought. Journalist Bruce Auster put it bluntly: “Winning
a share of the budget wars . . . require[s] that the military find new missions for
a post-Cold War world that is devoid of clear military threats.”63 Capitulating,
military leaders embraced formerly disdained assignments. As one commentator cynically observed, “the services are eager to talk up nontraditional,
budget-justifying roles.”64 The Vietnam-era aphorism, “It’s a lousy war, but it’s
the only one we’ve got,” was resuscitated.
Still, that doesn’t completely explain why in 2012 the military leadership
would succumb to a coup. To answer that question fully requires examination
of what was happening to the officer corps as the military drew down in the
1980s and 1990s. Ever since large peacetime military establishments became
permanent features after World War II, the great leveler of the officer corps
was the constant influx of officers from the Reserve Officers Training Corps
program. The product of diverse colleges and universities throughout the United
States, these officers were a vital source of liberalism in the military services.65
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, that was changing. Force
reductions decreased the number of ROTC graduates the services accepted.66
Although General Powell called ROTC “vital to democracy,” 62 ROTC programs were closed in 1991 and another 350 were considered for closure.67
The numbers of officers produced by the service academies also fell, but at a
significantly slower pace. Consequently, the proportion of academy graduates
in the officer corps climbed.68 Academy graduates, along with graduates of
such military schools as the Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, and Norwich
University, tended to feel a greater homogeneity of outlook than, say, the pool
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of ROTC graduates at large, with the result that as the proportion of such graduates grew, diversity of outlook overall diminished to some degree.
Moreover, the ROTC officers that did remain increasingly came from a
narrower range of schools. Focusing on the military’s policy to exclude homosexuals from service, advocates of “political correctness” succeeded in driving
ROTC from the campuses of some of our best universities.69 In many instances
they also prevailed in barring military recruiters from campus.70 Little thought
was given the long-term consequences of limiting the pool from which our
military leadership was drawn. The result was a much more uniformly oriented military elite whose outlook was progressively conservative.
Furthermore, well-meaning attempts at improving service life led to
the unintended insularity of military society, representing a return to the cloistered life of the pre-World War II armed forces. Military bases, complete with
schools, churches, stores, child care centers, and recreational areas, became
never-to-be-left islands of tranquility removed from the chaotic, crime-ridden
environment outside the gates.71 As one reporter put it in 1991: “Increasingly
isolated from mainstream America, today’s troops tend to view the civilian
world with suspicion and sometimes hostility.”72 Thus, a physically isolated
and intellectually alienated officer corps was paired with an enlisted force likewise distanced from the society it was supposed to serve. In short, the military
evolved into a force susceptible to manipulation by an authoritarian leader from
its own select ranks.
What made this all the more disheartening was the wretched performance of our forces in the Second Gulf War.73 Consumed with ancillary and
nontraditional missions, the military neglected its fundamental raison d’être. As
the Supreme Court succinctly put it more than a half century ago, the “primary
business of armies and navies [is] to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise.”74 When Iranian armies started pouring into the lower Gulf
states in 2010, the US armed forces were ready to do anything but fight.
Preoccupation with humanitarian duties, narcotics interdiction, and all
the rest of the peripheral missions left the military unfit to engage an authentic
military opponent. Performing the new missions sapped resources from what
most experts agree was one of the vital ingredients to victory in the First Gulf
War: training. Training is, quite literally, a zero-sum game. Each moment spent
performing a nontraditional mission is one unavailable for orthodox military
exercises. We should have recognized the grave risk. In 1991 the Washington
Post reported that in “interview after interview across the services, senior
leaders and noncommissioned officers stressed that they cannot be ready to
fight without frequent rehearsals of perishable skills.”75
The military’s anti-drug activities were a big part of the problem. Oh
sure, I remember the facile claims of exponents of the military’s counternarcotics involvement as to what “valuable” training it provided.76 Did anyone
really think that crew members of an AWACS—an aircraft designed to track
high-performance military aircraft in combat—significantly improved their
skills by hours of tracking slow-moving light planes? Did they seriously
imagine that troops enhanced combat skills by looking for marijuana under
car seats? Did they truly believe that crews of the Navy’s sophisticated antiair

Winter 2010-11

115

Charles J. Dunlap Jr.

and anti-submarine ships received meaningful training by following lumbering
trawlers around the Caribbean?77 Tragically, they did.
The problem was exacerbated when political pressures exempted the
Guard and the Reserves from the harshest effects of the budgetary cutbacks
of the early 1990s.78 The First Gulf War demonstrated that modern weapons
and tactics were simply too complex for part-time soldiers to master during
their allotted drill periods, however well motivated.79 Still, creative Guard
and Reserve defenders contrived numerous civic-action and humanitarian
assignments and sold them as “training.” Left unexplained was how such
training was supposed to fit with the military strategies that contemplated
short, violent, come-as-you-are expeditionary wars.80 Nice-to-have Guard and
Reserve support-oriented programs prevailed at the expense of critical activeduty combat capabilities.81
Perhaps even more damaging than the diversion of resources was the
assault on the very ethos of military service. Rather than bearing in mind the
Supreme Court’s admonition to focus on warfighting, the military was told to
alter its purpose. Former Secretary of State James Baker typified the trendy
new tone in remarks about the military’s airlift of food and medicine to the
former Soviet republics in early 1992. He said the airlift would “vividly show
the peoples of the former Soviet Union that those that once prepared for war
with them now have the courage and the conviction to use their militaries to
say, ‘We will wage a new peace.’”82
In truth militaries ought to “prepare for war” and leave the “peace
waging” to those agencies of government whose mission is just that. Nevertheless,
such pronouncements—seconded by military leaders83—became the fashionable
philosophy. The result? People in the military no longer considered themselves
warriors. Instead, they perceived themselves as policemen, relief workers,
educators, builders, health care providers, politicians—everything but warfighters. When these philanthropists met the Iranian 10th Armored Corps near
Daharan during the Second Gulf War, they were brutally slaughtered by a
military which had not forgotten what militaries were supposed to do or what
war is really all about.
The devastation of the military’s martial spirit was exemplified by
its involvement in police activities. Inexplicably, we ignored the deleterious
effect on combat motivation suffered by the Israeli Defense Forces as a result
of their efforts to police the West Bank and Gaza.84 Few seemed to appreciate
the fundamental difference between the police profession and the profession
of arms. As Richard J. Barnet observed in the New Yorker, “The line between
police action and the military operation is real. Police derive their power from
their acceptance as ‘officers of the law’; legitimate authority, not firepower, is
the essential element.”85
Police organizations are understandably oriented toward the studied
restraint necessary for the end sought: a judicial conviction. As one Drug
Enforcement Administration agent noted: “The military can kill people better
than we can [but] when we go to a jungle lab, we’re not there to move onto the
target by fire and maneuver to destroy the enemy. We’re there to arrest suspects
and seize evidence.”86 If military forces are inculcated with the same spirit
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of restraint, combat performance is threatened.87 Moreover, law enforcement
is also not just a form of low-intensity conflict. In low-intensity conflict, the
military aim is to win the will of the people, a virtually impossible task with
criminals “motivated by money, not ideology.”88
Humanitarian missions likewise undermined the military’s sense of
itself. As one Navy officer gushed during the 1991 Bangladesh relief operation,
“It’s great to be here doing the opposite of a soldier.”89 While no true soldier
relishes war, the fact remains that the essence of the military is warfighting
and preparation for the same. What journalist Barton Gellman has said of the
Army can be extrapolated to the military as a whole: it is an “organization
whose fighting spirit depends . . . heavily on tradition.”90 If that tradition
becomes imbued with a preference for “doing the opposite of a soldier,” fighting spirit is bound to suffer. When we first heard editorial calls to “pacify the
military” by involving it in civic projects,91 we should have given them the
forceful rebuke they deserved.
Military analyst Harry Summers warned back in ‘91 that when militaries lose sight of their purpose, catastrophe results. Citing a study of pre-World
War II Canadian military policy as it related to the subsequent battlefield disasters, he observed that:
instead of using the peacetime interregnum to hone their military
skills, senior Canadian military officers sought out civilian missions to justify their existence. When war came they were woefully
unprepared. Instead of protecting their soldiers’ lives they led them
to their deaths. In today’s post-Cold War peacetime environment,
this trap again looms large. . . . Some today within the US military
are also searching for relevance, with draft doctrinal manuals giving
touchy-freely prewar and postwar civil operations equal weight with
warfighting. This is an insidious mistake.92

We must remember that America’s position at the end of the Cold War
had no historical precedent. For the first time the nation—in peacetime—found
itself with a still-sizable, professional military establishment that was not
preoccupied with an overarching external threat.93 Yet the uncertainties in the
aftermath of the Cold War limited the extent to which those forces could be
safely downsized. When the military was then obliged to engage in a bewildering array of nontraditional duties to further justify its existence, it is little
wonder that its traditional apolitical professionalism eventually eroded.
Clearly, the curious tapestry of military authoritarianism and combat
ineffectiveness that we see today was not yet woven in 1992. But the threads
were there. Knowing what I know now, here’s the advice I would have given the
War College Class of 1992 had I been their graduation speaker:
•• Demand that the armed forces focus exclusively on indisputably military duties. We must not diffuse our energies away from our fundamental
responsibility for warfighting. To send ill-trained troops into combat makes us
accomplices to murder.
•• Acknowledge that national security does have economic, social, educational, and environmental dimensions, but insist that this doesn’t necessarily
mean the problems in those areas are the responsibility of the military to
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correct. Stylishly designating efforts to solve national ills as “wars” doesn’t
convert them into something appropriate for the employment of military forces.
•• Readily cede budgetary resources to those agencies whose business it is to
address the non-military issues the armed forces are presently asked to fix. We
are not the DEA, EPA, Peace Corps, Department of Education, or Red Cross—
nor should we be. It has never been easy to give up resources, but in the long
term we—and the nation—will be better served by a smaller but appropriately
focused military.
•• Divest the defense budget of perception-skewing expenses. Narcotics interdiction, environmental cleanup, humanitarian relief, and other costs tangential
to actual combat capability should be assigned to the budgets of DEA, EPA,
State, and so forth. As long as these expensive programs are hidden in the
defense budget, the taxpayer understandably—but mistakenly—will continue
to believe he’s buying military readiness.
•• Continue to press for the elimination of superfluous, resource-draining
Guard and Reserve units. Increase the training tempo, responsibilities, and
compensation of those that remain.
•• Educate the public to the sophisticated training requirements occasioned
by the complexities of modern warfare. It’s imperative we rid the public of
the misperception that soldiers in peacetime are essentially unemployed and
therefore free to assume new missions.94
•• Resist unification of the services not only on operational grounds, but also
because unification would be inimical to the checks and balances that underpin democratic government. Slow the pace of fiscally driven consolidation
so that the impact on less quantifiable aspects of military effectiveness can
be scrutinized.
•• Assure that officer accessions from the service academies correspond with
overall force reductions (but maintain separate service academies) and keep
ROTC on a wide diversity of campuses. If necessary, resort to litigation to
maintain ROTC campus diversity.
•• Orient recruiting resources and campaigns toward ensuring that all
echelons of society are represented in the military, without compromising
standards.95 Accept that this kind of recruiting may increase costs. It’s worth it.
•• Work to moderate the base-as-an-island syndrome by providing improved
incentives for military members and families to assimilate into civilian communities. Within the information programs for our force of all-volunteer
professionals (increasingly US-based), strengthen the emphasis upon such
themes as the inviolability of the Constitution, ascendancy of our civilian leadership over the military, and citizens’ responsibilities.
Finally, I would tell our classmates that democracy is a fragile institution that must be continuously nurtured and scrupulously protected. I would
also tell them that they must speak out when they see the institution threatened;
indeed, it is their duty to do so. Richard Gabriel aptly observed in his took To
Serve with Honor that:
when one discusses dissent, loyalty, and the limits of military obligations, the central problem is that the military represents a threat to
civil order not because it will usurp authority, but because it does not
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speak out on critical policy decisions. The soldier fails to live up to
his oath to serve the country if he does not speak out when he sees his
civilian or military superiors executing policies he feels to be wrong.96

Gabriel was wrong when he dismissed the military’s potential to
threaten civil order, but he was right when he described our responsibilities.
The catastrophe that occurred on our watch took place because we failed to
speak out against policies we knew were wrong. It’s too late for me to do any
more. But it’s not for you.
Best regards,
Prisoner 222305759
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